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Abstract
Measuring reaction times to number comparisons is thought to reveal a processing stage in elementary numerical cog-
nition linked to internal, imprecise representations of number magnitudes. These intuitive representations of the mental
number line have been demonstrated across species and human development but have been little explored in decision
making. This paper develops and tests hypotheses about the influence of such evolutionarily ancient, intuitive numbers
on human decisions. We demonstrate that individuals with more precise mental-number-line representations are higher
in numeracy (number skills) consistent with previous research with children. Individuals with more precise representa-
tions (compared to those with less precise representations) also were more likely to choose larger, later amounts over
smaller, immediate amounts, particularly with a larger proportional difference between the two monetary outcomes. In
addition, they were more likely to choose an option with a larger proportional but smaller absolute difference compared
to those with less precise representations. These results are consistent with intuitive number representations underlying:
a) perceived differences between numbers, b) the extent to which proportional differences are weighed in decisions, and,
ultimately, c) the valuation of decision options. Human decision processes involving numbers important to health and
financial matters may be rooted in elementary, biological processes shared with other species.
Keywords: decision making, numerical cognition, numeracy, proportional reasoning, individual differences.
1 Introduction
Intuitive representations of the mental number line are de-
fined as nonverbal representations of numerosity that are
spontaneously activated in the presence of numeric infor-
mation regardless of format (e.g., ••••, 4, four; Dehaene,
1996). The representations are “inner marks” that allow
verbal and nonverbal animals to “think unnamed num-
bers” (Koehler, 1950, cited in Gallistel, 1990). Trained
monkeys, for example, can order objects 1–9 by their nu-
merosity (Brannon & Terrace, 1998). Adult humans can
perform arithmetic operations quickly on larger arrays of
dots using these nonverbal mental magnitudes (Barth et
al., 2006).
The number domain is a prime example where strong
evidence points to a biologically determined, domain-
specific representation of number and elementary arith-
metic operations linked to the inferior parietal cortex,
specifically the horizontal intra-parietal sulcus in both
adults and children (Cantlon et al., 2006; Dehaene et al.,
2003; Pinel et al., 2001, 2004). Arabic, spelled-out, and
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spoken numerals all activate this area so that it is thought
to be involved in cross-modal, abstract representation and
manipulation of the quantity meaning of numbers, rather
than being activated by any specific number notation (Pi-
azza et al., 2004). Numerical-cognition researchers be-
lieve that this basic numerical intuition lays the founda-
tion for uniquely human mathematical reasoning (Wilson
et al., 2006; Halberda et al., 2008).
Number intuitions, however, are limited in their rep-
resentational power and do not directly support con-
cepts of fractions, probabilities, or even the precise num-
bers important to many decisions. Although little re-
search exists, processing these more sophisticated con-
cepts is thought to be based nonetheless on humans’ basic
“number sense” with brain areas originally developed for
other purposes co-opted for nonintuitive, symbolic num-
ber processing. The goal of this paper is to develop and
test hypotheses about the influence of such evolutionarily
ancient, intuitive numbers on human decisions.
Numerical information is ubiquitous in the decisions
that guide our lives, and it is generally assumed that if
provided appropriate numbers, people will be numerate1
enough to understand and use them as intended. Less nu-
merate individuals, however, fare less well in important
1Numeracy is defined as the ability to respond accurately to basic
probability and numerical questions.
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medical and financial decisions involving numeric infor-
mation (Estrada et al., 2004; Banks & Oldfield, 2007; Pe-
ters et al., 2006). The present research represents, to our
knowledge, the first attempt to explore whether an evo-
lutionarily ancient number-processing mechanism might
influence adult numeracy as well as choices involving nu-
meric information.
1.1 Perceptual discrimination in magni-
tude judgments
Number discrimination in human and non-human ani-
mals conforms at least qualitatively to Weber’s law such
that the greater the reference numerosity, the more im-
precisely human and non-human animals distinguish be-
tween it and nearby numerosities, causing confusions be-
tween nearby numbers — a distance effect. In their pi-
oneering studies of the symbolic distance effect (sym-
bolic numerals are numerosities conveyed with numeral
symbols such as Arabic integers or spelled-out number
words), Moyer and Landauer (1967) asked subjects to
judge the numerical order of Arabic numerals as rapidly
as possible (Is 2 greater than or less than 4?). Perfor-
mance was determined by the relative numerical distance;
the greater the distance between two numbers, the more
quickly their order was judged and the fewer errors were
made. Subjects are faster and more accurate in com-
parisons of 5 and 9 than they are in comparisons of 5
and 6. A size effect was subsequently found by Park-
man (1971) such that the greater the numerical value of
the smaller digit, the longer it took to judge their or-
der, holding constant the difference between the numbers.
As per Weber’s law, the discriminability of two magni-
tudes (whether symbolic or non symbolic) is a function of
their ratio rather than their absolute difference (Dehaene,
1997). The symbolic distance effect and size effect are
observed at least in the single- and double-digit ranges
(e.g., Dehaene et al., 1990, but see Link, 1990). The dis-
tance effect represents the discriminability of magnitudes
and the precision with which the mental number line is
represented. It is measured as the slope or difference of
the reaction times (RTs) when comparing numbers that
are close together versus far apart. A smaller slope in-
dicates greater numerical precision in the representations
of the numbers being compared.
Moyer and Landauer’s (1967) notion of a perceptual
comparator that explains the distance effect is shared by
the bulk of the models of numerical cognition that dif-
fer in other respects (see Algom et al., 1996; Dehaene,
1996; Gallistel & Gelman, 2005; Link, 1990). In it, a
perceived numerosity (greater than about three) is rep-
resented by a Gaussian-like distribution of activated nu-
merosities. Each distribution has a fixed width and dis-
tributions of two numbers being compared will overlap
more with smaller distances between two numbers and as
numbers get larger, thus increasing reaction times (RTs)
and errors in number-comparison tasks and explaining
the distance effect.
Although competing mathematical formulations of the
precision of mental-number-line representations exist
(Dehaene & Changeux, 1993; Gallistel & Gelman, 2005),
they make similar behavioral predictions in number-
comparison studies and (we believe) in decision mak-
ing. To begin with, more precise representations may
be associated with numeracy skills linked with decision
making in previous studies (Peters et al., 2006; Peters,
Hibbard, et al., 2007). In support of this notion, chil-
dren with more precise representations show better math
ability compared to children with less precise represen-
tations (Halberda et al., 2008). This finding may be due
to children with more precise representations discrimi-
nating numbers more easily and developing better math
abilities as a result or because differences in the quantity
or quality of engagement in formal mathematics might
increase the precision of representations (or to some third
factor that affects both measures). In the present paper
we measure the precision of mental-number-line repre-
sentations and test whether numeracy scores among col-
lege students were associated with the precision of their
representations.
Hypothesis 1: Individuals with more precise represen-
tations will be higher in numeracy than those with less
precise representations.
In decision making, individuals with more precise rep-
resentations should also discriminate between two num-
bers better and perceive the numbers to be further apart
than those with less precise representations. Numeric
differences between options that are perceived as larger
should result in a greater difference in the perceived val-
ues of the two options.
1.2 Implications of individual differences
in the precision of mental-number-line
representations for decision making
Human decision making likely derives in part from the
same mechanisms evolved by other animals in response
to risky natural environments (Weber et al., 2004). To
the extent that intuitive rather than deliberative process-
ing mediates human decision making, humans and ani-
mals should demonstrate similarities in choice processes.
Animals spontaneously use numerosity based on ratios
to make decisions (Meck & Church, 1983). Hauser et
al. (2003), for example, found that untrained cotton-top
tamarind monkeys oriented their heads towards a speaker
more often when a novel number of syllables were spo-
ken; “novelty” was indexed by the ratio between two nu-
merosities independent of their absolute value.
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Table 1: The subjective difference between two numbers based on different logarithmic bases for mapping
If the ratio of two
numbers =
Hypothetical individuals: 2/1 5/1 10/1
Person A — Natural-log mapping .693 1.609 2.303
Person B — Log10 mapping .301 .699 1.000
Perceived differences between A and B — Person A finds the difference between
the two numbers more attractive by: .392 .910 1.303
We hypothesized that individuals with smaller
distance-effect slopes (more precise representations)
would perceive greater differences between two numbers
compared to individuals with larger slopes and that this
perception would, in turn, guide valuation processes
underlying choice. The curve that relates numerical
distance to reaction time is approximated by a logarith-
mic function (e.g., Dehaene, 1989).2 We hypothesized,
therefore, that individual differences in the precision
of mental-number-line representations would be due to
individuals having different bases for the logarithmic
function that converts symbolic numbers to perceived
numbers. Logarithmic transformations of numbers have
useful properties that can be applied to understanding the
possible effects of individual differences in the precision
of mental-number-line representations on the valuation
of numeric differences.
To begin with, a logarithmic transformation means that
the perceptual difference between two numbers will de-
pend on their proportional difference and not their sub-
tractive difference. For example, imagine that Person A’s
representation depends on a natural-log (base e) transfor-
mation. A proportional difference of two (100 compared
to 50 or 10 compared to 5) would engender a perceived
difference of .693 (ln(2x)-ln(x) = .693 for all x; Table 1).
The subjective difference between 100 and 50 would then
be the same as that between 800 and 400 or 12 and 6. Bar-
ring any influence from other processes, this means that
an individual who preferred a 60% chance to win $100
over a certain $50 will also tend to prefer a 60% chance
to win $800 over $400 and 60% to win $12 over $6.
Second, Person A will always perceive a greater dif-
ference between two numbers compared to Person B who
has a larger base for the logarithmic transformation. For
example, imagine that Person B demonstrates a larger
distance-effect slope than Person A and his representa-
2Functions other than logarithmic conform to the behavioral data as
well. We use a logarithmic function in our example because it appears
to be a somewhat better fit to data from human numerical-estimation
studies and monkey neural-response curves during a number-estimation
task (Siegler & Opfer, 2003; Nieder & Miller, 2003).
tion uses a log10 transformation (compared to A’s natural-
log transformation). In this case, with a proportional dif-
ference of two, B would perceive a difference of .301
(log10(2x)-log10(x) = .301 for all x) whereas A would per-
ceive a difference of .693 (ln(2x)-ln(x) = .693 for all x).
Thus, Person A would perceive a bigger difference than
B on the subjective number scale.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals with more precise repre-
sentations of the mental number line will make choices
consistent with valuing the same proportional difference
more than individuals with less precise representations.
We test this hypothesis in Study 1’s intertemporal
choices between immediate, smaller rewards and later,
larger rewards as well as in Study 2’s choice between
options that offer larger absolute differences but smaller
proportional differences and an option that offers a
smaller absolute difference but larger proportional differ-
ence.
The extent of the difference in preferences among
those with more and less precise representations, how-
ever, should depend on the extent of the proportional dif-
ference between two numbers in a choice. Specifically,
perceptual differences between individuals who vary in
the precision of their mental-number-line representations
will be greater with larger proportional differences be-
tween two numbers. With a larger compared to a smaller
proportional difference, Person A would perceive an even
greater difference than Person B. For example, a propor-
tional difference of five would engender perceived differ-
ences of 1.609 and .699 for Person A and Person B, re-
spectively (see Table 1), suggesting that both individuals
would value five times more of X more than they would
twice more of X, but Person A would find it even more
attractive than Person B.
Hypothesis 3: Individuals with greater precision will
weigh proportional differences among numeric attributes
even more in choice than those with less precise repre-
sentations when larger compared to smaller proportional
differences exist between numeric attributes.
We test this hypothesis in Study 1 with two intertempo-
ral choices (a choice between an immediate, smaller re-
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ward and a delayed, larger reward) that differ in the extent
of the proportional difference between the two monetary
rewards.
1.3 Study aims
Given indication of the existence of individual differences
in the precision of mental-number-line representations
and their link with higher order number skills in children
(Halberda et al., 2008), the overarching aim of this paper
is to measure individual differences in precision using a
distance-effect paradigm and then to relate this measure
to performance in two decision tasks. The decision tasks
we chose are quite different on the surface but contain el-
ements of number comparisons (absolute versus propor-
tional differences) that should relate to the precision of
mental-number-line representations. Because such rep-
resentations have been associated with number skills in
children, we also test this relation in an adult sample.
Subsequently, we test for the effects of these represen-
tations on decisions with and without controlling for nu-
meracy and age. For simplicity, the distance-effect task
and two decision tasks are presented as three separate
studies, but all three tasks were conducted with the same
group of subjects.
2 General methods
2.1 Subjects
Younger and older subjects were recruited in order to ex-
amine the generalizability of effects at the two ends of
the adult continuum. Some evidence also suggests that
older adults may rely more than younger adults on auto-
matic mechanisms, such as mental-number-line represen-
tations, rather than controlled processes in judgment and
decision processes (Peters, Hess, et al., 2007).
Initially-recruited subjects included 83 younger adults
from the University of Oregon who received course credit
for participation and 79 older adults from local senior
centers who were paid $20 each for their participation (an
additional $5 each was donated to their senior center).
2.2 Procedure
Subjects first completed a number-comparison (distance-
effect) study conducted on a computer, and then re-
sponded to the two decision tasks3, measures of numer-
acy (Lipkus et al., 2001; see Appendix A for items),
3Initial subjects completed only the distance-effect studies. The de-
cision tasks were initiated after the first 16 younger adults had been
tested successfully on the distance-effect tasks.
fluid intelligence, and crystallized intelligence and re-
sponded to some demographic questions. For fluid in-
telligence, the WAIS III Letter-Number Sequencing and
digit-symbol substitution tasks (Wechsler, 1997) were
used to assess working memory functioning and process-
ing speed, respectively. Higher scores on each task mean
better working memory and faster speed of processing,
respectively. For crystallized intelligence, subjects com-
pleted Vocabulary Test II (parts 1 and 2) from the Kit of
Factor-Referenced Tests (Ekstrom et al., 1976).
2.3 Distance-effect tasks
We conducted two distance-effect tasks modeled on prior
research (Dehaene, 1996; Temple & Posner, 1998). In
each task, a quantity was shown in the middle of the com-
puter screen and subjects responded whether the quantity
shown was bigger or smaller than a target quantity (e.g.,
Is 4 bigger or smaller than 5?). After responding to a
given quantity, that quantity would disappear and the next
quantity would appear. No feedback about accuracy was
provided. The target quantity was held constant in each
block. Reaction time (RT) and accuracy were recorded
for each response. Half of the subjects responded “larger”
with the right hand and “smaller” with the left; for the
other half of the subjects, this was reversed. Half of the
subjects in each hand condition completed a Standard
task (described below) first followed immediately by a
Modified task; order was reversed for the other half of
the subjects.
In the Standard distance-effect task with single-digit
numerosities, subjects were presented with one of four
Arabic integers 1, 4, 6, and 9 in one block and corre-
sponding arrays of dots in another block and were asked
to press one of two large buttons to indicate as quickly
and accurately as possible whether the quantity shown
was larger or smaller than “5”. The Arabic integers were
displayed at 2 cm height. The dots were displayed in a
5x5 cm square, one dot taking up the whole square and
more dots condensed to fit that space. Half of the quanti-
ties shown were close to the target 5 (4 and 6); the other
half were numerically farther from the target 5 (1 and 9).
Subjects were shown two blocks per notation type with 8
practice trials and 80 experimental trials per block. Block
order was counterbalanced across subjects.
A Modified distance-effect task, using numbers be-
tween 0 and 1 that are often important in decision mak-
ing, was also conducted. The procedure was similar to
the standard task except that subjects were presented with
quantities corresponding to 10%, 25%, 40%, 60%, 75%,
and 90% in three notation types (decimals, e.g., “.10”,
frequencies, e.g., “10 out of 100”, and percentages, e.g.,
“10%”) and were asked to indicate as quickly and accu-
rately as possible whether the quantity shown was bigger
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Table 2: Sample characteristics in the younger and older age groups.
Characteristic Younger adults(N = 80)
Older adults
(N = 65) Inferential test for difference between two age groups
Mean age 20.2 74.0 t(87.7) = –64.7a****
Age range 18–43 64–90
% female 68% 64% χ2 (df = 1) = .24
Speed of processing 83.0 55.1 t(142) = 12.0****
Working memory 10.8 9.4 t(120) = 3.8a***
Vocabulary 19.9 27.6 t(143) = –8.1****
Numeracy 8.6 7.5 t(143) = 3.6***
Education 13.7 15.3 t(76.8) = –4.3a****
Health 4.7 4.3 t(140) = 2.9**
a Due to unequal variances, a Satterthwaite approximation was used to calculate df and t-values.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. ****p < .0001.
or smaller than the target “50%.” The quantities repre-
sented three distances from 50%: near, middle, and far.
The middle quantity was included only to make the Stan-
dard and Modified task appear more different. The stim-
uli were 2 cm high and varied in width. The width of
“X out of 100” was the longest, at approximately 12 cm
in length. Subjects responded to six blocks (two per no-
tation type) with 12 practice trials and 120 experimental
trials per block.
3 General results
Three younger adults and fourteen older adults were ex-
cluded from analyses due to computer problems, loud
noises during the computer task, or inattention to the task,
for a total of 145 subjects (80 younger adults and 65 older
adults) used in the analyses. The two age groups included
similar proportions of female subjects. Younger adults
scored higher than their older counterparts on measures
of processing speed, working memory, and numeracy,
and scored lower on vocabulary. Younger adults reported
fewer years of education and better health. See Table 2.
We first report reaction-time and error results from the
distance-effect tasks and analyze their relation with nu-
meracy. Using a hierarchical linear modeling approach,
we estimate the distance effect shown by each subject
across notations and subsequently use this measure of the
precision of mental-number-line representations to test
hypotheses in two decision tasks.
3.1 The distance-effect study
Data from the standard and the modified distance-effect
tasks were combined. However, to have comparable data
from both tasks, we deleted all RTs associated with the
mid-distance on the modified task (analyses of the modi-
fied task were similar with and without these middle val-
ues). RTs that were judged as too fast and indicative of
inattention were deleted.4 RTs over 3 standard deviations
from the subject’s mean (after standardizing within the
Standard and Modified tasks) were also treated as miss-
ing (Ratcliff, 1993) (total = 4.1% missing data). The pro-
portion of errors was low (mean errors = 1.9%; range =
0–8.9%).
Then, for each subject, the average unstandardized RT
for each notation type, distance (near and far) and magni-
tude was computed first across all RTs for correct and in-
correct trials. The 20 average RTs per subject (5 notations
x 2 distances x 2 bigger/smaller than target) were then
entered into a random-effects model using SAS PROC
MIXED.5,6 All subjects had complete data. Predictors of
4For younger adults, RTs less than 200 msec for the Standard dis-
tance effect task and less than 250 msec for the Modified task were
treated as missing. For older adults (who process information more
slowly), RTs less than 250 and 300 msec for the Standard and Modified
tasks, respectively, were treated as missing.
5A random-coefficient model is more appropriate for analyses where
the independent variables are continuous; in this case, a random-effects
model was considered more appropriate because the distance variable
had only two values. The Kenward and Rogers method was used for
calculating degrees of freedom as it is more appropriate with more com-
plicated covariance structure when sample sizes are moderate to small
and the design is reasonably balanced (Schaalje et al., 2001).
6Unlike the more traditional repeated-measures analysis of variance
often used to analyze such reaction-time data, a random-effects model
can simultaneously produce the individual-slope estimates needed for
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these average RTs were age group (coded –1 for younger
adults and +1 for older adults) and numeracy (a continu-
ous variable and mean-deviated) at Level 2 and distance
(coded as –1 for near and +1 for far), and notation (en-
tered as a categorical variable) at Level 1. The model
also included five two-way interactions (age group with
notation and distance, notation with distance, numeracy
with age group and distance) and the three-way interac-
tion of numeracy, age group, and distance). In a sepa-
rate analysis, the number of errors made by each subject
was entered at Level 2 to test for between-subjects speed-
accuracy tradeoffs and was entered at Level 1 for each
subject in each of the 20 cells to test for within-subjects
speed-accuracy tradeoffs. Subjects who were faster over-
all (the between-subjects effect) made significantly more
errors in this task, F(1,141)=21.03, p<.001. However, in-
clusion of the number of errors at Level 1 and Level 2 did
not substantially change the effect of distance or its inter-
action with numeracy.7 Because no such tradeoff (bias)
was evident within subjects, F(1, 2368) = .98, p = .32,
and previous research was based on RTs to correct tri-
als only, we present analyses based on mean RTs to cor-
rect trials only throughout the rest of the paper. Analy-
ses of RTs and of the relation of individual differences in
the distance effect with performance in the decision tasks
were similar, however, with and without inclusion of in-
correct trials. The relation of these individual differences
to numeracy and to decision performance was also similar
when the individual differences were re-estimated from a
weighted average of the distance effect based on RTs and
on errors.
The model results corroborated previous findings and
demonstrated a significant interaction between the dis-
tance effect and numeracy such that individuals higher
in numeracy showed smaller distance effects (i.e., more
precise representations of the mental number line). Be-
cause the focus of the present paper is on the relation of
the distance-effect slope with decision making and not on
the distance effect itself, full results of the model can been
found in Appendix B.
Smaller slopes (less of an RT change between near and
far comparisons; see Figure 1) indicate greater precision
of representations of the mental number line. The differ-
ence from the smallest to the largest distance effect was
about 1/10 of one second (mean of the average RT for far
comparisons minus the average RT for near comparisons
= –45 msec, range = –115 to +9 msec). We examined the
the decision tasks, thus influencing our choice of analysis technique.
Because such models can be unstable with too many predictor variables,
we reduced the number of variables in the model but also analyzed the
data using the more traditional ANOVA technique with all possible pre-
dictors and interactions and found similar results.
7For example, without the errors, the test of the numeracy by dis-
tance interaction yielded F(1,141)=4.01, p<.05 (see Table B1); with the
errors included, the same F(1,141)=4.17, p<.05)
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Figure 1: Quintile split on the distance-effect slope across
younger and older adults (n = 29/quintile).
reliability of the measure first by examining the correla-
tions between mean RT differences for number compar-
isons that were near versus far among the five notations.
The distance effect appears to be a reliable individual-
difference construct across notations (Cronbach’s alpha
= .76).
To examine individual differences, the random-effects
model was used to approximate each subject’s distance-
effect slope (which represents the degree to which num-
bers near versus far from a target can be discriminated
from the target and thus represents the precision of men-
tal numbers) by modeling each subject’s average RT to
near and far magnitudes separately for each notation. For
each individual, the near RT was subtracted from the far
RT by notation and then averaged across all notations
and divided by a constant of one to produce the “slope”
variable. This choice of denominator allows us to inter-
pret results in the decision tasks based on millisecond
changes in the size of the distance effect. Since the re-
sulting slope variable was significantly skewed, one out-
lier was winsorized from –103 to –90.5. The reliability of
the distance-effect measure was calculated for each indi-
vidual and then averaged across individuals (average re-
liability, λ, of the ordinary least squares estimator as a
measure of the distance-effect slope = .72; Raudenbush
& Bryk, 2002). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, smaller
distance-effect slopes were moderately correlated with
higher numeracy (r = .29, p < .0018). See Appendix B
for further discussion of this relation. Hypothesis 1 was
supported.
8This same correlation was r = .31 when the slope variable was cal-
culated using correct plus incorrect mean RTs.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 8, December 2008 Intuitive numbers 625
4 Study 1
If multiple sources of information exist in a decision
(even if it is multiple transformations of given numbers),
then individuals who represent the mental number line
more precisely should perceive a proportional difference
between two numbers as greater than those who have less
precise representations, and they should weigh it more in
decisions.9 Thus, we predict that the proportional differ-
ence between magnitudes of an immediate and a delayed
reward (rather than their simple subtractive difference)
will matter more for individuals with smaller distance-
effect slopes compared to those with larger slopes (Hy-
pothesis 2). In addition, the extent of the perceived dif-
ference between two monetary rewards for those with
smaller slopes compared to larger slopes will be larger
with larger proportional differences between the mone-
tary rewards (Hypothesis 3). As a result, the distance-
effect slope should be a better predictor of intertemporal
choices when the proportional difference between the re-
wards is larger (compared to smaller) even if the subtrac-
tive difference between the rewards is smaller.10
4.1 Methods
Subjects (N = 129; 64 were younger adults) responded to
two hypothetical intertemporal choices. One choice had
a small proportion difference between the monetary re-
wards offered, but a larger subtractive difference ($100
now or $110 in a month). The second choice ($10 now or
$15 in a week) had a larger proportional difference and
a smaller subtractive difference (it also offered a greater
implied rate of return). Subjects responded to both prob-
lems on a 12-point preference scale ranging from –6 =
much prefer [the smaller reward] now to +6 = much pre-
fer [the larger reward] later; no zero-point was included.
If we ignore time-delay differences and treat dollar
differences simply as symbolic numbers, then smaller
slopes, which indicate more precision, should lead to a
greater perceived difference between the two monetary
rewards, particularly when a larger proportional differ-
ence exists such as in the $10/$15 choice. This means
9Hypotheses about subtractive differences are unclear because such
processes are thought to be based upon an unknown interaction of intu-
itive and exact systems (Gelman & Butterworth, 2005).
10The time delay between the immediate and delayed reward may
show an effect on choices opposing that of the reward magnitudes
because timing processes may share an underlying mechanism with
mental-number-line representations (Meck & Church, 1983). Specifi-
cally, individuals with more precise representations (smaller distance-
effect slopes) may perceive the same time delay as further away than
those with less precise representations causing them to prefer the im-
mediate reward. At the same time, they are hypothesized to perceive
the same ratio difference in monetary outcomes as bigger than those
with less precise representations, causing them to prefer the larger, but
delayed, reward. See footnote 14 for additional discussion.
that individuals with smaller slopes should be particularly
likely to choose the delayed rewards in this choice. Go-
ing back to our initial example for illustration, Person A
with the natural-log transformation would perceive a dif-
ference between 100 and 110 of .095 whereas Person B
(log10 transformation) would perceive a .041 difference.
Log transformations of 10 versus 15 ( the second choice)
demonstrate a greater difference in perceived number be-
tween Persons A and B (.405 for Person A and .176 for
Person B). Thus, we predict a greater association of the
slope (due to proportional differences) independent of nu-
meracy with preferences in the $10/$15 choice as com-
pared to the $100/$110 choice.
4.2 Results and discussion
Subjects tended to prefer the smaller, immediate reward
in the $100/$110 choice (mean preference = –1.4; SD =
4.7) and the larger, later reward in the $10/$15 choice
(mean preference = 1.8; SD = 4.3). Individuals who de-
layed reward in one choice also tended to delay reward
in the other choice (r = .51, p < .001). Simple correla-
tions of the distance-effect slope with choices provided
preliminary support for Hypothesis 3; in the $10/$15
choice (with the greater proportional difference), indi-
viduals with smaller (less negative) distance-effect slopes
were more likely to delay rewards; no such relation ex-
isted in the $100/$110 choice (r = .18, p < .05, and –.03,
ns, respectively, in the $10/$15 and $100/$110 choices).
A test of these two dependent correlations indicated that
they were significantly different, supporting Hypothesis 3
that responses will be associated with the distance-effect
slope and more so for larger than smaller proportional
differences between outcomes, T2(126) = –2.4, p = .0211
(Steiger, 1980).
We also controlled for age and numeracy in analyses of
the effects of the precision of mental-number-line repre-
sentations (measured by the distance-effect slope) on de-
cisions for statistical reasons12 and because previous ag-
ing literature suggests the potential for differential effects
of numeracy and the distance-effect slope on choices of
younger and older adults. In Study 1, we tested two gen-
eral linear models to examine the effect of the distance-
effect slope separately on each choice controlling for nu-
meracy and age (all variables are mean-deviated) and test
11The identical test of dependent correlations based on distance-
effect slopes calculated from mean correct plus incorrect RTs revealed
similar results. The correlations of this slope variable with preferences
in the $100/$110 choice and $10/$15 choice were r=–.04 and r=.18,
respectively, T2(126) = –2.5, p = .01.
12The estimator of the distance effect was not perfectly reliable (av-
erage reliability, λ, of the ordinary least squares estimator=.72) and the
slope estimates are a reliability-weighted combination of the person
data with data from the age and numeracy group to which the person
belongs (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
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Table 3: Intertemporal choice — General-linear-model results of the scaled preference (–6=much prefer immediate
reward to +6=much prefer delayed reward) by the distance-effect slope, age, numeracy, and gender.
$100/$110 choice,
F(10, 115) = 1.2,
ns, R2 = .09
$10/$15 choice,
F(10,115) = 2.1,
p < .05, R2 = .15
Predictor Estimate F-value Estimate F-value
Intercept –1.18 2.50
Age .87 3.60† .29 0.53
Numeracy .35 1.57 .29 1.39
Slope .02 0.28 .08 4.78*
Age*Numeracy .05 0.03 .06 0.07
Age*Slope –.02 0.28 –.02 0.52
Numeracy*Slope .01 0.08 –.04 3.65†
Age*Numeracy*Slope .02 0.69 .02 1.50
Gender –.68 1.98 –.78 3.41†
Gender*Numeracy .18 0.52 .31 1.94
Gender*Slope –.04 0.96 –.05 2.09
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
whether the slope predicted choices over and above the
influence of age and numeracy. The 2- and 3-way in-
teractions of age with numeracy and slope were added
to test the hypothesis that the decisions of older adults
might reflect more automatic processes such as the dis-
tance effect than controlled processes such as numeracy
compared to younger adults (Peters, Hess, et al., 2007).
Gender and its interactions with numeracy and slope were
also included because Frederick (2005) found gender dif-
ferences in the influence of numeracy on intertemporal
choices. Age group and gender were treated as categori-
cal variables and slope and numeracy were treated as con-
tinuous.
For the $100/$110 decision, no variable attained con-
ventional significance after controlling for all other pre-
dictors (see Table 3 for inferential statistics).
For the $10/$15 decision, individuals with smaller
distance-effect slopes delayed reward significantly more
often (means = 2.5 and 1.2, respectively, for those with
smaller and larger slopes based on a median split of the
slope). Examination of parameter estimates in Table 3
indicates that, for every one millisecond decrease in the
size of the distance effect, preferences for $15 in a week
(over $10 now) increased by .08 units on the preference
scale. Individuals with smaller distance-effect slopes de-
layed reward significantly more often only in the $10/$15
choice. Hypothesis 2 (that individuals with more precise
representations will value the same proportional differ-
ence more than individuals with less precise representa-
tions, regardless of the size of the proportional difference)
received only partial support since the effect of slope on
the $100/$110 choice was not significant. Hypothesis 3,
which posited a larger effect of the slope in choices with
larger compared to smaller proportional differences, was
supported. Predicted preferences (shown in Figure 2) il-
lustrate this effect controlling for all other factors13.
Thus, the precision of the mental number line appears
to influence choices and to influence them more when
a larger proportional difference existed between two op-
tions, as indicated by the significant difference in depen-
dent correlations.
Are the effects due to general intelligence? Control-
ling for individual differences in continuous measures of
working memory, speed of processing, and vocabulary in
the analyses of the two choices in Table 3 revealed lit-
tle difference in the influence of the slope on choices be-
tween $100 and $110 (the coefficient for the slope was
.021, p = .60 in Table 3 and .031, p = .45 after controlling
13This predicted slope effect in the $10/$15 choice was qualified by
a marginally significant numeracy X slope interaction such that among
those with smaller distance-effect slopes, numeracy had little associa-
tion with choices (actual means = 2.7 and 2.3, respectively, for those
with lower and higher numeracy among those with smaller slopes) but
numeracy was strongly associated with a tendency to delay rewards
among those with larger slopes (means = 0.1 and 3.3, respectively, for
those lower and higher in numeracy who had larger slopes). Gender did
not have conventionally significant effects; excluding gender and its in-
teractions from the analyses made no substantive difference to the slope
results. It appears that having one type of number skill can compensate
for a lack of other skills.
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Figure 2: Study 1. Predicted preference by slope quintile
split (–6 = prefer immediate reward to +6 = prefer delayed
reward).
for the three measures) or between $10 and $15 (the coef-
ficient for the slope was .076, p = .03 in Table 3 and .071,
p = .05 after controlling for the three measures). Simple
correlations of the slope with the $100/$110 and $10/$15
choices were r = –.03 and .18, respectively, without the
three measures and .01 and .18, respectively, with them.
Intelligence, as assessed by these proxy measures, does
not explain the effects of the precision of mental-number-
line representations on these intertemporal choices.
The influence of the distance-effect slope on intertem-
poral choices suggests the possibility of a stable compo-
nent of discount factors that could be modeled (Soman
et al., 2005). Like Soman et al., we also suggest a non-
linear effect in such choices. However, while they dis-
cuss a nonlinearity for outcomes due to time (immediate
rewards are processed differently than delayed rewards;
see also McClure et al., 2004), we argue for a nonlin-
earity independent of their proposed effect based on the
proportional difference in the two monetary outcomes.
A limitation of this study is that we did not equate over-
all preferences or time delay across the two choices. It
is possible that the precision of mental-number-line rep-
resentations may have been associated with choices, not
only because of a proportional difference in the mone-
tary outcomes but also because precision could be asso-
ciated with sensitivity to timing processes as well (Meck
& Church, 1983).14 In Study 2, we examine the relation
14For example, individuals with more precise representations may
discriminate quantities of time more than those with less precise rep-
of precision in a choice that pits proportional differences
against absolute differences in the absence of any timing
differences.
5 Study 2
We next employed a task designed by Fetherstonhaugh
et al. (1997) to discriminate the influence of proportional
reasoning from subtractive differences in choices, when
subtractive differences are normatively relevant.
5.1 Methods
In the task, subjects (N=120; 60 were younger adults15)
were told to imagine that they distributed money for a
charitable foundation to institutions that develop treat-
ments for serious diseases. In the current choice, they
were to select one proposal to fund (awarding $10 mil-
lion) from three submitted proposals. Institution X pro-
posed to treat a disease and reduce deaths from approx-
imately 15,000/year to about 5,000/year, Institution Y
would reduce deaths from approximately 160,000/year to
145,000/year, and Institution Z would reduce deaths from
approximately 290,000/year to 270,000/year. Note that a
choice of Institution Z saves the greatest number of lives
(about 20,000) but the smallest proportion of lives (6.9%)
whereas Institution X saves the fewest number of lives
(about 5,000) but the greatest proportion (67%).
We expected that individuals with more precise
mental-number-line representations (smaller distance-
effect slopes) would perceive the differences in propor-
tions as greater and, as a result, would be more likely
than other subjects to choose Institution X, the option that
saved the greatest proportion of lives (but fewest number
of lives). Greater numeracy, on the other hand, might
be expected to relate to choosing Institution Z to save the
greatest absolute number of lives as it has been associated
resentations just as they may discriminate numeric quantities more. If
true, there will be an effect of time in the direction opposite that of the
monetary rewards as the one week or one month is perceived as further
off in time for individuals with more versus less precise representations.
Following the same logic used to develop Hypothesis 3, however, the
differential influence should be greater with a one-month than a one-
week delay and would predict more choices of the immediate option for
those with more precise representations, particularly with longer delays.
Although this effect cannot fully explain the present data, it could con-
tribute to the greater impact of the slope in the $10/$15 choice (where
the shorter delay will exert less of an opposing effect for those high in
precision versus those low in precision) and the lack of its effect in the
$100/$110 choice (where the longer delay will exert more of an oppos-
ing effect for those high versus low in precision). Such individual differ-
ences in the precision of representations (as measured by the distance-
effect slope) could potentially explain recent results by Zauberman et
al. (2008) concerning nonlinearities in sensitivity to objective time and
their relation to intertemporal choices.
15The sample size was lower than in the distance-effect tasks and
Study 1 due to an experimenter error in the materials.
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Table 4: Logistic-regression results of Institution-X
choices in the charitable-foundation task.
Predictor Estimate (df = 1) Wald χ2
Intercept –.61 7.31**
Age .50 4.96*
Numeracy .11 0.63
Slope .04 3.85*
Age*Numeracy .04 0.10
Age*Slope –.003 0.03
Numeracy*Slope –.003 0.08
Age*Numeracy*Slope .02 2.77†
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
with a greater weighting of absolute numeric differences
in choice (Peters et al., 2006).
5.2 Results and discussion
Examination of the simple effect of the distance-effect
slope revealed a non significant trend in the expected di-
rection (43% and 26% of those with smaller and larger
slopes, respectively, chose X). As in Study 1, we next an-
alyzed the choice results controlling for age, numeracy,
and their interactions with the slope.
As hypothesized, individuals with smaller distance-
effect slopes appeared to value the larger proportional
difference more; they chose Institution X (which saved a
smaller number of lives but a greater proportion of lives)
more often than those with larger distance effects (see
Table 4 for inferential statistics based on logistic regres-
sion16 and Figure 3 for predicted choices based on the
slope on average across age and numeracy and after con-
trolling for the interactions). Neither numeracy nor its in-
teraction with the distance-effect slope was significantly
related to performance in the logistic regression.17 Thus,
contrary to the hypothesis that the effects of numeracy
and the distance-effect slope would be dissociable, higher
numeracy was not associated with a greater weighing of
absolute differences (although smaller slopes were asso-
ciated with a greater weighing of the larger proportional
difference after controlling for numeracy). The possible
differential effects of the precision of mental-number-line
representations and numeracy deserve further study.
16Using the slope variable calculated from mean RTs based on cor-
rect plus incorrect trials, the slope variable produced a similar effect
(estimate = .04, Wald chi square = 4.2, p=.04).
17Older adults, however, were significantly more likely to choose In-
stitution X than their younger counterparts, perhaps suggesting an in-
creased weighting of proportional information with age (44% and 26%
of older and younger adults, respectively, chose X).
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Note that the effect of greatest interest here cannot
be explained by the simple assumption that those with
smaller distance-effect slopes are simply better at every-
thing; here they are more likely to give the normatively
incorrect response.
The marginal three-way interaction between age, nu-
meracy, and slope in Table 4 suggests the possible pres-
ence of different effects of the precision of mental-
number-line representations on choices among younger
and older adults. Hypotheses from the cognitive-aging
literature suggest that choices of younger adults may be
driven more by controlled processes (perhaps such as
numeracy) whereas the decisions of older adults may
be driven more by automatic processes (perhaps such
as the precision of representations; Peters, Hess, et al.,
2007). Contrary to this hypothesis, however, it appears
from Table 5 that the choices of younger adults and
of highly numerate older adults were more consistent
with our precision-of-representations hypothesis; in all
three comparisons of large to small slope (less numer-
ate younger adults, highly numerate younger adults, and
highly numerate older adults), individuals with smaller
slopes (more precise representations of the mental num-
ber line) chose Institution X more often than those with
larger slopes.18
After partialling out the effects of the three proxy in-
telligence measures, the distance-effect slope was still as
18Choices of less numerate older adults were not differentiated by the
precision of these representations as indexed by the slope. We specu-
late that their choices may be indicative of more superficial processing
of numeric information. Further studies are needed to explore these in-
teractions of age with numeracy and the precision of representations in
more depth and illuminate possible reasons for the effects.
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Table 5: Proportion of choices of Institution X among younger and older individuals who vary in the precision of
mental-number-line representations (shown as a median split on the distance-effect slope) and numeracy (low scores
= 4–8; high scores = 9–11 out of 11 possible)
Younger adults Older adults
Large slope Small slope Large slope Small slope
Less numerate 6.7% 35.7% 34.6% 35.7%
Highly numerate 14.3% 34.6% 42.9% 87.5%
Total 9.1% 35.0% 37.5% 54.6%
predictive of choices; the coefficient for the slope (slope
estimate = .04 in Table 4) remained .04 with the addi-
tion of the three proxy measures. Individuals with smaller
distance-effect slopes appear to value the option with the
largest proportional savings of lives (that saved the fewest
lives) more than individuals with larger distance-effect
slopes.
6 General discussion
Previous research has emphasized numeracy as an impor-
tant factor in health and financial decisions. Results of
the present paper suggest that another key concept may
be precision of mental-number-line representations that,
while modestly related to numeracy, is a separable and
measurable construct.
In the present studies, individual differences in this
precision, as measured by differences in reaction times,
ranged across a mere tenth of a second and appeared to
influence numerical reasoning in decisions based on pro-
portional differences. This evolutionarily ancient intu-
itive sense of numbers was independently associated with
choices whereas higher-level numeracy skills were not.
Intuitive number representations appear to underlie: a)
perceived differences between numbers, b) the extent to
which proportional differences are weighed in decisions,
and, ultimately, c) the valuation of decision options. The
effects remained after controlling for proxy intelligence
measures.
6.1 Further development of an intuitive-
numbers model
To further explore possible effects of individual differ-
ences in mental-number-line representations, we plot hy-
pothetical logarithmic mappings from symbolic numbers
to perceived numbers in Figure 4 and discuss implica-
tions for decision making. As in the Introduction, each
line represents an individual, one of whom, Person A, has
a smaller logarithmic base for the mapping compared to
Person B (A demonstrates a smaller distance-effect slope
than B and represents numbers more precisely).
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Figure 4: Hypothetical logarithmic mappings from sym-
bolic numbers on the x-axis to subjective (or perceived)
numbers on the y-axis. Each line represents a hypothet-
ical individual with a different logarithmic base for the
transformation.
Six characteristics of the graph in Figure 4 should be
noted. First, an exact linear transformation was used for
symbolic numbers 1, 2, and 3 due to a separate process
that is not a focus of the present paper (i.e., subitizing;
Feigenson et al., 2004). Second, both lines follow We-
ber’s Law with marginal increases in perceived numbers
decreasing with increases in symbolic numbers; this per-
ceptual effect may explain the property of diminishing
marginal returns (e.g., Prospect Theory, Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979) and suggests the possible existence of a
stable component of value that could be modeled across
situations at the individual level. As a result and as noted
in Hypothesis 2 in the Introduction, the perceptual dif-
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ference between two numbers (which should influence
choices between options) will depend on their propor-
tional difference and not their subtractive difference (see
Weber et al., 2004).
Third, an individual with a smaller base for the loga-
rithmic transformation (Person A) will always perceive a
greater difference between two numbers than an individ-
ual with a larger base (Person B), as illustrated by the line
for Person A always being above the line for Person B.
Fourth, the difference in perceived numbers between the
two individuals expands with increasing symbolic num-
bers (the lines get further apart at higher numbers as the
line for Person B gets flatter than that for Person A at
smaller numbers). One implication is that Person B with
the larger base will not only perceive numbers less pre-
cisely but will demonstrate greater insensitivity to large
numbers compared to Person A (e.g., large numbers of
human lives; Slovic, 2007; Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997).
Fifth, the x-axis can be used to represent either a sym-
bolic number (such as 10 or a proportional difference be-
tween two numbers (such as 10 times more); the figure
is accurate for ratios only for ratios greater than 3, how-
ever, as we chose to represent 1, 2, and 3 as having ex-
act representations due to subitizing (see the first point
above). Finally, and as suggested in Hypothesis, indi-
viduals with more precise representations will perceive
larger proportional differences as even bigger (compared
to those with less precise representations) than smaller
proportional differences.
6.2 Age differences
Although not a major focus of the present paper, mean
age differences were found in both numeracy and the
distance-effect slope when other predictors were not con-
trolled for (see Table 2 and the latter part of Appendix
B). One might have expected older adults to rely rela-
tively more than their younger counterparts on intuitive
processes such as the distance-effect slope and to rely rel-
atively less on deliberative processes such as that assessed
in the numeracy measure (Mather, 2006; Peters, Hess, et
al., 2007). This expectation, however, was not supported
in our data. Instead, when controlling for other predic-
tors such as numeracy and the distance-effect slope, no
age differences were found in the intertemporal choice
task, providing some basis for speculation that such fac-
tors could underlie, at least in part, observed age differ-
ences in decision making. In Study 2, however, older
adults were more likely than younger adults to choose the
institution that saved the larger proportion but smallest
absolute number of lives; in addition, a marginally sig-
nificant three-way interaction occurred between age, nu-
meracy, and the slope. More targeted future research may
discover that we can begin to explain some age differ-
ences in decisions involving numeric information through
a consideration of numeracy and the precision of mental-
number-line representations.
6.3 Concluding remarks
Researchers studying judgment and choice have found
that decisions are based on some combination of stable
values learned from experience and preferences that are
constructed from the decision context (Lichtenstein &
Slovic, 2006; Payne et al., 1999). We propose an ad-
ditional view that intuitive representations of the men-
tal number line also influence valuation across multiple,
otherwise unrelated, decision contexts and may provide a
stable component of perceived value that can be modeled.
Individuals are increasingly being asked to make deci-
sions about vital life issues in which numbers play a ma-
jor role. The evolutionarily ancient mechanism described
here appears to guide in part such modern-day choices.
The present results imply that these mental-number-line
representations can potentially support or degrade deci-
sion quality. It seems likely that they would most often
improve decision quality, however, because more precise
representations would allow a decision maker to distin-
guish better between numeric attributes in choice (e.g.,
mortgage rates in buying a home, survival rates in choos-
ing a cancer treatment).
More broadly, our proposed framework may lay the
foundation for a better understanding of the oft-cited link
between greater educational attainment and improved
health and wealth (Goesling & Baker, 2008; Goldman &
Smith, 2002; Deary, 2008). Greater education may lead
to improved intuitions about numbers as well as greater
numeracy. These two related, but separable, number
skills may lead to improved decision skills in situations
that involve an understanding and use of numbers, and
ultimately may lead to better choices about health and fi-
nancial risks (e.g., Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff,
2007). The extent to which formal education influences
the learning of lower-level number intuitions, and subse-
quently guides the development of decision competencies
used to make risky health and financial decisions, remains
to be tested.
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Appendix A. Numeracy items (Lip-
kus et al., 2001).
Numbers — you may not use a calculator for any of these
questions.
1. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times.
(That would mean that we roll one die from a pair of
dice.) Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you think
the die would come up as an even number? Answer:
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Table B1. Results of random-effects model of mean correct reaction times.
Results of random-effects model of
mean reaction times
Results after inclusion of
working memory, processing speed,
and vocabulary
Predictor df (num, den) F-value df (num, den) F-value
Age group 1, 141 101.71*** 1, 138 7.21**
Notation 4, 572 45.70*** 4, 572 45.70***
Distance 1, 141 566.74*** 1, 141 566.74***
Numeracy 1, 141 8.28** 1, 138 7.21**
Age*Notation 4, 572 0.75 4, 572 0.75
Age*Distance 1, 141 1.57 1, 141 1.57
Age*Numeracy 1, 141 2.79† 1, 138 3.20†
Notation* Distance 4, 2026 5.07*** 4, 2026 5.07***
Distance*Numeracy 1, 141 4.01* 1, 141 4.01*
Age*Distance*Numeracy 1, 141 2.64 1, 141 2.64
Working memory 1, 138 0.95
Processing speed 1, 138 40.79***
Vocabulary 1, 138 2.65
Note. Results of random-effects model of mean correct and incorrect reaction times were quite similar, did
not show evidence of a speed-accuracy trade off, and are not reported.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of win-
ning a $10.00 prize are 1%. What is your best guess about
how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 peo-
ple each buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS? Answer:
people
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the
chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What percent of
tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a
car? Answer: %
4. Which of the following numbers represents the
biggest risk of getting a disease?
1 in 100 1 in 1000 1 in 10
5. Which of the following numbers represents the
biggest risk of getting a disease?
1% 10% 5%
6. If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten
years, and Person B’s risk is double that of A’s, what is
B’s risk? Answer: % in years
7. If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100
in ten years, and person B’s risk is double that of A, what
is B’s risk? Answer: in years
8. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many
people would be expected to get the disease:
A: Out of 100? Answer: people
B: Out of 1000? Answer: people
9. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100,
this would be the same as having a % chance of
getting the disease.
10. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005.
Out of 10,000 people, about how many of them are ex-
pected to get infected? Answer: people
Appendix B. Results of the random-
effects model of reaction times and
the relation of the distance-effect
slope with overall speed and numer-
acy.
Results of the random-effects model
In this model of RTs to correct trials, younger adults re-
sponded faster than their older counterparts (see Table
B1). RTs also differed by notation and distance. The
effect of notation and distance did not differ by age, in-
dependent of the other predictors in the model. This lack
of age difference in the distance-effect slope is consistent
with previous literature (Geary & Lin, 1998). The dis-
tance effect did differ by notation, consistent with more
recent research (Koechlin et al., 1999).
Across the life span, highly numerate individuals were
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Table B2. General linear model predicting numeracy scores.
F(3, 138) = 9.1, p < .0001,
R-squared = .17
F(6, 135) = 7.64, p < .0001,
R-squared = .25
Predictor b-values F-value(df = 1) b-values
F-value
(df = 1)
Gender (–1 = male, +1 = female) –.42 7.34** –.50 10.73***
Age group –.43 8.26** –.45 3.80*
Distance-effect slope .03 6.84** .03 7.16**
Working memory -- .08 1.12
Processing speed -- .02 2.09
Vocabulary -- .07 7.31**
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
faster than the less numerate at these number-comparison
judgments; numeracy was marginally less predictive of
reaction times for older than younger adults. In addition,
the slope of the distance effect was significantly smaller
for the high numerate (the mean RT difference between
near and far numbers was –48 and –40 msec for individu-
als low and high in numeracy, respectively). The effect of
numeracy on the distance effect did not differ by age al-
though this effect approached significance (p = .11), with
a tendency for a smaller association between numeracy
and the distance effect among older adults. The inclu-
sion of measures of working memory, processing speed,
and vocabulary substantially reduced the effects of age
on comparing numbers in this task, but otherwise had lit-
tle influence on the results (see far right column of Table
B1).
Results of a more traditional repeated-measures analy-
sis of variance (ANOVA) including all main effects and
interactions were similar to those of the random-effects
model (e.g., the two-way interaction between distance
and numeracy was significant, F(1, 137) = 4.09, p < .05).
In this more traditional ANOVA, the distance effect did
not differ by whether individuals responded larger on the
left or on the right (and thus we did not include left/right
in the random-effects model for reasons of parsimony).
According to Sternberg’s (1969) classic additive-
factors model, the violation of additivity between dis-
tance and numeracy indicates that they influence the same
stage of processing numbers, namely the internal opera-
tion that maps symbolic numbers to the mental number
line and determines the quantities of the two compared
stimuli (Dehaene, 1996). Thus, the more numerate ap-
pear to map numerals to mental representations more pre-
cisely than the less numerate. The fact that less numerate
people have both longer RTs and a steeper slope has led to
the suggestion that reaction times should be transformed
to force equivalent slopes. However, as Sternberg has ar-
gued effectively, because reaction time is a measure of
central nervous system processes, RTs should be treated
as interval data (Townsend, 1992). Thus, we use the un-
transformed mean RT.
Alternative explanations for the relations
among the distance-effect slope, overall
speed, and numeracy
Alternative explanations exist for the associations of
overall number-comparison speed and distance-effect
slope and of numeracy and the slope. One possible
explanation for the latter correlation is that individuals
with more precise representations are better able to learn
higher-order math skills. Our correlational data cannot
speak to this possibility, but it is suggestive of interesting
future studies in educating math skills and the precision
of mental-number-line representations. Recent research
in numerical cognition is consistent with this explanation
(Dehaene et al., 2008; Halberda et al., 2008).
A second alternative explanation for both correla-
tional results is a scaling artifact. The additive-factors
method used to test the link between numeracy and the
distance-effect slope requires that RTs be treated as in-
terval data and thus without transformation (Sternberg,
1969; Townsend, 1992); a scaling effect could result in
a smaller slope for the highly numerate simply because
they are faster and their RTs get closer to a floor com-
pared to the less numerate (Ratcliff, 1993). Past stud-
ies in numerical cognition have established a series of
three additive component processes or stages in reaction
times and event-related potentials to number comparisons
(Dehaene, 1996; Temple & Posner, 1998). In particu-
lar, a separation appears to exist among the three stages
of 1) stimulus identification (manipulated through nota-
tion), 2) access to magnitude representations (manipu-
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Table B3. General linear model predicting distance-effect slopes.
F(2, 139) = 4.1, p < .05,
R-squared = .06
F(5, 136) = 2.93, p < .05,
R-squared = .10
Predictor b-values F-value (df =1) b-values F-value (df = 1)
Gender (–1 = male, +1 = female) –1.25 1.03 –1.57 1.59
Age group –3.20 7.37** –.66 0.12
Working memory -- –.92 2.27
Processing speed -- .21 5.30*
Vocabulary -- –.06 0.07
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
lated through distance), and 3) motor preparation (manip-
ulated through larger being indicated with a left or a right
hand press). In a random-effects model of mean correct
RTs with distance and notation at Level 1 and left/right,
numeracy, and age at Level 2, we tested the interaction of
numeracy with each of the three stages. Numeracy inter-
acted significantly only with distance and not with nota-
tion or left/right, suggesting that numeracy differentiates
the specific effect of distance rather than the other factors.
In addition, a comparison of RTs to the Arabic integers 1,
4, 6, and 9 (to a target “5”) between this study and that
of Dehaene (1996) suggests that our reaction times do
not show a floor effect. In particular, number-comparison
responses of Dehaene’s subjects averaged 380 msec com-
pared to 477 msec to the same integers in the present
study. The comparison is not a perfect one, however, as
Dehaene’s subjects first participated in a pretest to famil-
iarize them with the task and to reject exceptionally slow
or fast subjects. The findings that: 1) numeracy was sig-
nificantly associated with only one of the three factors
in the additive-factors method, 2) more extreme reaction
times to the same Arabic integers were found in Dehaene
(1996), and 3) Halberda et al. (2008) found that more
precise representations were associated with better math
skills in children who completed a very different number-
comparison task (not dependent on RTs) suggest that our
results are less likely due to a scaling artifact. Greater nu-
meracy appears to be associated with more precise repre-
sentations of the mental number line.
Predictors of numeracy and the distance-
effect slope
We next examine factors that predict numeracy and the
distance-effect slope. Previous findings have demon-
strated that women score lower than men on numeracy
measures; the relation of gender with the precision of
representations of the mental number line has not been
a focus. First, using a general linear model of numer-
acy scores, we examined the effects of gender, age group,
measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence, and the
distance-effect slope. The model was highly significant
(see Table B2). Men, younger adults, and those with
higher vocabulary scores scored higher in numeracy. The
link between numeracy and the distance-effect slope re-
mained after controlling for the other variables in the
model. In particular, the b-value for the slope was .03
with and without controlling for the three proxy measures
of intelligence.
In predictions of distance-effect slopes, the only sig-
nificant predictor was processing speed, with individu-
als who processed information more quickly also demon-
strating less steep slopes. See Table B3. Neither gen-
der nor age provided significant, independent predic-
tion of the variability in distance-effect slopes after con-
trolling for the effects of fluid and crystallized intelli-
gence. Older age was predictive of larger distance-effect
slopes (less precise representations) without controlling
for these proxy intelligence measures.
